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Abstract 
 
The Great East Japan Earthquake and the following tsunami, which occurred on March 3rd, 
2011, was a natural disaster of an unprecedented scale. One of its more severe aftermaths,  
the accident in Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, remains unresolved until this day. 
Thousands of people were relocated due to the nuclear contamination, and the local 
communities were severed. This paper addresses the discussion about the further exploitation 
of nuclear power in Japan, which arose as a consequence of the nuclear accident. Although  
the Japanese government intends to continue relying on atomic energy, various statistics have 
shown the citizens’ objection. In this qualitative study, the representatives of three areas within 
Tohoku region were asked about their opinions towards nuclear power plants, and their 
arguments. The interviews were analyzed through the premises of socio-psychological  
dual-process theory, which explains how the opinions are constructed. One’s personal 
experience, perception of benefit or loss, and the trust towards the government and the energy 
companies proved to be the crucial factors for opinions’ construction. Moreover, the tragedy 
contributed to end the indifference of citizens, disappointed with the centralized government 
and its poor disaster response. The importance of the local authorities is increasing, and the 
close-knit societies are recovering faster. Lastly, the Japanese urgent need for alternative 
energy sources became visible, however currently there is no substitute capable of replacing 
nuclear power completely.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In Japan, one of the most seismically active regions in the world, earthquakes are common 
events in daily lives of its people. However, the one that hit the north-eastern coast of Japan  
on 11th March 2011 peaked at a tremendous 9.0 magnitude and together with following 
tsunami caused incommensurables damages on few hundreds kilometers of  coastline. Despite  
the disaster affected Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima prefectures particularly, the latter suffers 
specific consequences. The Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, a facility managed  
by Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO), that had been operating since the 1970s1 sustained 
a substantial damage that ultimately led to the meltdown of several reactors and the 
evacuation of the surrounding areas. The accident in this complex, often called the biggest 
nuclear accident since Chernobyl, has stirred up the international debate about the safety  
and reliability of nuclear energy. In Japan, where natural resources are limited, in March 2011 
there were 50 nuclear reactors operating, making up to 30% of overall country’s energy2.  
For that reason, it should not be a surprise that a public debate about the further exploitation  
of nuclear energy is particularly complicated. 
Since the accident in Fukushima Daiichi, numerous surveys keep showing the anxiety  
and negative attitude of Japanese towards the nuclear energy. However, the development  
of nuclear power facilities in Japan began with a much more positive spirit. The very first 
Japanese nuclear reactor, in northern part of Ibaraki prefecture, was constructed in 1955. 
Marely few years after the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japanese 
people drew a strict distinction between military and industrial usage of nuclear power. 
Although it happened not without an influence of the US policy “Atoms for Peace”, Japanese 
huge enthusiasm towards the development of nuclear power plants widely echoed abroad.  
                                                          
1 “Tokyo Electric Power Company: A List of the Nuclear Power Supply Facilities”, accessed 21 April, 2017, 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/challenge/energy/nuclear/plants-e.html. 
2 “World Nuclear Association: Nuclear Power in Japan”, accessed 4 May 2017, http://www.world-
nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/japan-nuclear-power.aspx. 
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Few questionnaires conducted between the 1950s and the 60s proved that the Japanese were 
looking at the new source of energy through rose-colored spectacles until the beginning  
of the 1970s, when some anti-nuclear movements appeared due to the growing public 
awareness on environmental issues and fear of radioactive waste. A significant wave  
of criticism arose in the early 1980s due to Three Miles Island accident in 1979 and accident  
in Tsuruga nuclear power plant in 1981. Although the latter was of minor consequences,  
as the first such incident in Japan resulted in atomic energy’s reliability being shaken.  
In the following years, despite the Chernobyl accident (1986) greatly exacerbated public anxiety, 
Japanese energy policy was still focused on promoting nuclear power and in the early 1990s  
it reached the pre-disaster level, constituting one third of the overall country’s energy supply.  
As the consequence of such a growing dependence, together with active campaigns promoting 
nuclear energy as clean and environmental-friendly, statistical data until mid-2000s present 
that Japanese people were not against further development3.  
The Japanese government, taking advantage of such a favorable atmosphere, aimed its energy 
policy for subsequent development of nuclear energy facilities4. However, after the 3/11 
disaster and its consequences, specifically the ones related to the meltdown of nuclear reactors  
in Fukushima prefecture, The National Diet of Japan issued an official order to investigate  
the conditions surrounding the series of events that led to the accident. Fukushima Nuclear 
Accident Independent Investigation Commission, directed by Dr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, reached  
to the conclusion that “the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant cannot be regarded 
 as a natural disaster. It was a profoundly manmade disaster – that could and should have been 
foreseen and prevented. And its effects could have been mitigated by a more effective human 
response” 5 . The emitted manuscript, later known as Kurokawa Report, criticizes first  
and foremost TEPCO, for a gross negligence in the reactors’ construction, undertaking 
insufficient or mistaken technical measurements after the earthquake, as well as for incomplete 
                                                          
3 Tetsuji Shibata and Hiroaki Tomokiyo, 福島原発事故と国民世論 [Fukushima Nuclear Accident and Public 
Opinion] (Tokyo: ERC出版, 2014), 2-32. 
4 Ibid., 32. 
5 The National Diet of Japan, The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Commission [executive summary], 9, accessed 26 April 2017, https://www.nirs.org/wp-
content/uploads/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf.  
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or missing instructions and unsatisfactory emergency drills. However, the Commission has 
revealed another powerful mechanism responsible for this catastrophic accident. The nuclear 
village (原子力村  Genshiryoku mura), as commonly called, is a community producing, 
researching and promoting nuclear energy which involves e.g. governments officials, 
representatives of major energetic companies, scientist and specialists employed in nuclear 
power managing bodies6. Hence, the disastrous consequences of Fukushima nuclear accident 
were triggered by the sequence of human errors and negligence within not only TEPCO,  
but also Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, the authorities of Fukushima Prefecture and 
NISA (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency). Moreover, the Kurokawa Report reveals  
an insufficient disaster response, for example lack of information about the accident provided 
by TEPCO and its subcontractors, neither to the workers in the power plant nor to general 
public, including the inhabitants of the nearby towns who only received a vague order  
to evacuate.  
Nowadays, according to the 4th Strategic Energy Plan issued in April 2014, Japan intends  
to radically change its energy policy. The plan confirms that after the 3/11 disaster, when all the 
fifty nuclear reactors producing energy for Japan was shut down, country’s self-sufficiency rate 
declined drastically and Japan became dependent on imported fossil fuels. In order  
to overcome the unfavorable situation, the Japanese government intends to create  
a "multilayered and diversified flexible energy supply-demand structure”7, which would 
maintain nuclear energy as one of the base-load power sources, yet increases the role  
of renewable energy in the demand-supply chain. However, “dependency on nuclear power 
generation will be lowered to the extent possible” 8  and, taking into consideration  
the circumstances surrounding the meltdown in Fukushima Daiichi, before restarting any 
nuclear power facility, all the security requirements would have to be fulfilled along with  
the cooperation between the host municipalities and the Japanese government. As a proof  
of this statement, Japan aims to establish Fukushima prefecture as the renewable energy 
                                                          
6Jeff KIngston, “Japan’s Nuclear Vilage” The Asia-Pacific Journal 10-37 (2012), accessed 18 June, 2017, 
http://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/3822/article.pdf.  
7 Ministry of Technology, Trade and Industry, Strategic Energy Plan (April 2014), 21, accessed 4 May 2017, 
http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/pdf/4th_strategic_energy_plan.pdf.  
8 Ibid., p. 24.  
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center. The 4th Energy Plan is concluded by the remark of promoting “dialogue with all levels  
of the society in order to increase transparency over the energy policy planning process and 
obtain public trust in the policy”9.  
However, while an increasing number of nuclear reactors are expected to resume their 
operational status, a debate about the necessity of nuclear power and its role in Japanese 
energy policy is still vivid. Despite the widely-spread belief that the victims of the 3/11 disaster 
are strongly against nuclear power plants due to the tragic experience, it in fact remains 
unknown what are those people’s attitudes and opinions, and how they are constructed. This 
paper aims to present the opinions on nuclear power plants among  the selected part  
of Japanese population who was affected by the 3/11 disaster, and examine the emotional and 
cognitive components which shape those opinions. In order to verify which of them, if any, are 
dominant, the dual-process theory is applied. This is a theory developed in social psychology 
within the last few decades which explains how human perception is constructed and what 
processes are involved in the attitude formation. Roots of the theory may be traced back to the 
views of such influential philosophers like Descartes, Kant or Hegel. In the 20th century they 
were adopted and rethought by psychologists which, resulted in lively debates between 
empiricists, behaviorists, pragmatists and representatives of Gestalt school of psychology10. 
Nowadays, dual-process theory developed mainly within last three decades, may be applied  
in such distant areas like e.g. cognitive psychology, social studies or marketing management.  
It is frequently applied to studies on attitude changes or risk perception11.  
The basic assumption of the theory is that perception of reality is twofold: people may act  
in a “mindless” manner and rely on prior knowledge, stereotypes or expectancies or they can 
apply “mindful” strategy which requires cognitive effort in order to process new information12. 
                                                          
9 Strategic Energy Plan., p. 89.  
10 Gordon B. Moskowitz, Ian Skurnik and Adam D. Galinsky, “The History of Dual-Process Notions, and the Future of 
Preconscious Control” in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology, ed. Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope (New 
York: The Guilford Press, 1999), 13-36. 
11 Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope, ed., preface to Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology (New York: The 
Guilford Press, 1999), ix. 
12 Gordon B. Moskowitz, Ian Skurnik and Adam D. Galinsky, “The History of Dual-Process Notions, and the Future of 
Preconscious Control”, 13.  
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In other words, attitude is formed on the basis of immediate, often emotional reaction as well 
as by the thoughtful, effortful processes. Due to the complexity of the surrounding world, 
individuals tend to categorize already known phenomena and objects in order to minimize 
intellectual effort and maximize effects. Human nature makes us struggle to achieve a state  
of being confident, to have control of the situation, and possess verified truth. In case of overly 
ambiguous incidents, which one’s mind is not able to classify into any category, the state  
of confusion appears. Confusion, or dissonance, is not only “psychologically uncomfortable”,  
it is also inconvenient from a pragmatic point of view. Verified, coherent knowledge enables 
individuals to behave correctly according to the circumstances, therefore when the state  
of confusion appears, one is not able to act adequately and accordingly, thus survival capacity 
decreases. In order to estimate what amount of information is needed, psychologists 
established a term, “sufficiency threshold”. Its value is low for minor issues and is proportional 
to the complexity of the circumstances. Moreover, what is said to be a general tendency is that 
the more one is motivated to obtain verified knowledge, the greater intellectual effort one  
is ready to perform13.  
This paper presents the complexity on building opinions while the state of confusion has been 
perpetuated for already six years. How do people seek information? What criteria do they apply 
to consider a piece of information trustworthy or not? How do they verify it? There are studies 
presenting the urgent need among Japanese society to gain knowledge (Tsujikawa et al 2016), 
similar statements appear in testimonies from direct victims. Although there is a considerable 
amount of research done among other nations (Wiwattanapantuwong et al 2011, Prati and Zani 
2012, Visschers and Siegrist 2013, Visschers and Wallquist 2013, Wiwattanapantuwong et al 
2013, He at al 2014, Siegrist et al 2014), Japanese opinions toward nuclear energy after 
Fukushima disaster seem to be neglected by non-Japanese scholars and the number  
of publications available in English remains astonishingly limited. While it is of great importance 
to understand how the international audience reacts to the Fukushima disaster and how the 
accident influenced the tendencies in the support of energy sources, the current results cannot 
                                                          
13 Gordon B. Moskowitz, Ian Skurnik and Adam D. Galinsky, “The History of Dual-Process Notions, and the Future of 
Preconscious Control”, 22-28.  
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be translated into Japanese context, since each country’s cultural characteristics, beliefs, values 
and socio-political background may significantly determine the opinions and perceptions.  
In Japan, regarding the controversies around nuclear power plants, a huge number of people 
currently is supposed to be at the “psychologically uncomfortable” state of  dissonance. 
Moreover, various images of nuclear energy and expectations that people hold towards it,  
are accused to have cause a clash of values within the Japanese society (Fam et al 2014).  
Presently, when technology and science have inevitably become a part of everyday life,  
the need to establish and maintain the effective dialogue between politicians, scientists and 
laypeople is urgent. According to the social definition of risk, what is lacking in the case  
of scientific evaluation (cultural context, beliefs, values and plethora of personal experience) 
guarantees the social and moral assessment of it, and constitutes a valid argument of why the 
opinions of laypeople should be taken into account while a policy is being established (Renn & 
Swaton 1984). Moreover, integrating top-down with bottom-up approach can provide 
information tailored to a specific risk, which was absent in the case of the Fukushima nuclear 
disaster when it was not properly addressed (Linkov et al 2014). The effective, two-way risk 
communication ought to be transparent, non-hierarchical and balanced (based neither on the 
values nor on the science itself), however it requires a significant degree of mutual willingness 
and trust (Renn 2004).  
In view of the lack of trust penetrating the society, Japanese scholars frequently stress  
the importance of an effective two-way communication, as well as the need to continue studies 
on Japanese citizens opinions on reconstruction policies (Honda et al 2014, Kimura 2016).  
The crucial problems regarding decontamination, rising the grounds, seawalls construction  
or the management of temporary housing are firstly, conflicts and controversies between the 
citizens, and secondly, local governments’ limited power and dependency on central authorities. 
Although the number of NGOs and bottom-up movements raised after the 3/11 disaster, they 
still have relatively little possibilities due to the Japanese centralized political system14.  
                                                          
14 Takehiko Hobo, Kōichi Hasegawa and Hironao Ōzaki .岐路に立つ震災復興。地域の再生か消滅か [Disaster 
Reconstruction on the Crossroads. Towards Revival or Towards Vanishing?] (Tokyo: 東京大学出版会, 2016), 5-22. 
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This study attempts to make the voice of few individuals be heard in the discussion and analyze 
the emotional and cognitive processes which lead the subjects to define themselves  
as opponents or supporters of nuclear power plants. Such knowledge can contribute  
to the improvement of risk communication between local communities and authorities  
or experts. 
1.1 The Review of the Secondary Literature 
This section introduces psychological and sociological studies, that have been conducted until 
now, on perceptions, opinions and attitudes towards energy sources, which distinguish 
between cognitive and emotional factors. It also demonstrates how psychological factors relate 
to the sociological aspects of disasters and disaster-related risks.  
In this field’s nomenclature attitude and opinion are crucial concepts which, although 
commonly considered synonyms, stand for two separate terms and the relation between them 
should be explained in advance. According to dual-process theory, cognitive and emotional 
factors create attitude which subsequently shapes opinion, guides behavior and support. 
However, opinion versus attitude dichotomy is also a possibility. In such case, the factors which 
shaped the attitude are presumed to provide the sufficient explanation for such contradiction.  
Thus, examination of attitude-shaping components may contribute to more insightful analysis  
of opinions about nuclear energy.  
Such a relation between attitude and support, regarding various reconstruction policies  
and further exploitation of nuclear power after the Fukushima disaster, is not known yet in case 
of Japanese people (Honda et al 2014). In the US studies, cognitive-affective model happened  
to be particularly accurate in case of nuclear energy. The reason may be related to the fact that 
people usually hold mixed feelings toward nuclear energy, since the model did not prove useful 
in case of the widely supported wind energy (Truelove 2012).  
Demographic factors have also been widely examined in relation to one’s acceptance of various 
energy sources. According to the general tendency in Japan, young men and people who 
obtained higher education are usually more in favor comparing to elderly and women, who are 
often against (Arikawa et al 2014, Honda et al 2014, Iwai and Shishido 2015). Although 
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cognitive and emotional processes have been frequently examined together with such socio-
demographical factors, the latter one showed no statistical significance in multiple studies 
(Truelove 2012, Siegrist at al 2014, Prati and Zani 2013, Visschers & Siegrist 2013). For example, 
Italian studies proved that the most important factors for building attitudes are values and pro-
environmental beliefs (Prati & Zani 2013). Another results obtained in Switzerland demonstrate 
that rather than demographic factors, trust and perceived benefits are essential for attitude-
formation (Siegrist at al 2014). Another studies, after examining cognitive and affective factors 
separately, showed that the former were more reliable to predict opinions. The only exemption 
was a question about nuclear siting (Truelove 2012) which may be explained by the contextual 
characteristics attributed to the nuclear power plants, such as: great number of fatalities  
or losses expected in case of an accident, huge catastrophic potential, lack of personal control, 
artificiality of risk source, that result in them typically being considered dreadful and difficult  
to tolerate15. However, Japanese studies conducted after the Chernobyl accident proved that 
the crucial factors for settling one’s opinions were: perceived usefulness, trust toward electric 
companies and judgment on nuclear power plants’ potential to be controlled, while anxiety 
alone was not decisive. Even people opting for the abolishment of nuclear power plants 
mentioned cognitive factors more often than emotional, e.g. predicted big scale of nuclear 
accident, problem of nuclear waste, favorable attitude toward environmental protection 
(Shimooka 1993).  
On the other hand, multiple studies prove the importance of the context in which the risks are 
experienced (Renn & Swaton 1984, Renn 2004, Wachinger et al 2013), as well as the 
seriousness of personal consequences (Wachinger et al 2013). It cannot be denied that 
Fukushima disaster was an event with enormous load of personal experience. Approximately 
150,000 people were forced to evacuate due to the accident16, this unchained a series  
of stressful events, separation from the family, anxiety about returning home, starting life  
in a new community, vicissitudes of a new lifestyle, to name a few. These factors coincidently 
led to a myriad of health threatening conditions ranging from psychological to physiological 
                                                          
15 Renn, Ortwin. Risk governance: coping with uncertainty in a complex world. London: Earthscan, 2010 p.  
16 The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 19.  
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diseases. Given the magnitude of the unprecedented catastrophe, even people who were not 
directly affected showed an overwhelming emotional pain in the form of confusion, frustration, 
anger, anxiety etc. With this in mind, it was suggested by Japanese scholars that the relation 
between one’s experience of 3/11 and the acceptance of the nuclear power plants should be 
examined (Tsujikawa et al 2016).  
The public opinion, having known that the disastrous consequences of Fukushima nuclear 
accident were triggered by the sequence of human errors and negligence, showed a huge 
disappointment and dissatisfaction with the politicians, energy companies and  mass media 
(Tsujikawa et al 2016, Fam et al 2014). In general, the Japanese public is unsatisfied with 
disaster response and current recovery solutions, however without the mutual trust between 
laypeople, politicians and scientists, expectations and desires of all involved parties are not 
likely to be fulfilled. A concept of trust, defined as what is “used as a shortcut to reduce the 
necessity of making rational judgments based on knowledge” (Renn 2004), is classified  
as a cognitive component (Truelove 2012, Honda et al 2014, Tsujikawa et al 2016), regardless  
of the connotations to the emotional sphere which it may evoke. As a strong belief-related 
component (Truelove 2012), trust may be understood as a subjective probability that certain 
new information is true, in accordance with the definition of belief being a “subjective 
probability that the object has a certain attribute”17. In other studies trust was examined 
together with cognitive components due to its strong relation with the values. Values do not 
change easily, neither does trust, therefore it is believed to be stable enough not to be 
classified as an emotional factor (Visschers et al 2013, Prati and Zani 2012). Trust and its 
relation to perceived risk from various energy sources has been researched thoroughly. 
According to the prevailing tendency, the lower the individual’s knowledge is, the higher the 
extent one relies on the trust toward managing bodies. Moreover, individuals with the low 
degree of trust, showed a higher risk perception than those with a high degree of confidence 
(Renn 2004, Tsujikawa et al 2016, Iwai and Shishido 2015, Visschers and Siegrist 2013). In the 
case of Fukushima, recorder testimonies of direct victims showed that the level of trust  
                                                          
17 Icek Ajzen and James Sexton, “Depth of Processing, Belief Congruence, and Attitude-Behavior Correspondence” 
in Dual-Process Theories in Social Psychology, ed. Shelly Chaiken and Yaacov Trope (New York: The Guilford Press, 
1999), 118.  
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in authorities and the management of nuclear energy industry was very high, therefore, 
paradoxically, people’s preparedness for disaster was not sufficient and they relied on advices 
from authorities which also happened to be unsatisfactory.   
On the basis of the above presented literature review, it can be realized that cognitive factors 
have been frequently found dominant due to the increasing degree of personal knowledge 
among general public, and easy to estimate aspects of loss and benefit. On the other hand,  
the ambivalence regarding who is trustworthy, that leads to anxiety and confusion, together 
with the significance of a personal experience, define the complexity of the Japanese context 
which may result in a dominance of emotional factors. 
1.2 Methodology 
It cannot go unnoticed that previously conducted studies, which were presented above, 
examine attitudes and opinions toward energy sources through the application of the 
quantitative methods on a large sample of population18. While they are a point of reference  
of a great value which, together with the statistics, illustrates previous and present tendencies 
in changing public opinion, the limitations of the quantitative studies ought to be specified.  
Firstly, there is a certain dose of ambiguity surrounding the method of constructing questions. 
Even a slight change in a question’s formulation may guide respondents towards the answer 
preferred by the authors of the questionnaire and subsequently, due to the fact that such 
changes were made rather frequently in Japanese questionnaires in the past, the comparison  
of the results or their interpretation may be dubious19. The Japanese study showed that even  
the order in which the questions are asked is not without influence. In a conducted survey, one 
group of the participants was given questions before they obtained information about Japan’s 
energy situation, another group answered the questions after becoming familiar with those 
facts. The results in both groups were clearly guided by the presence or lack of the information 
(Arikawa et al 2014). Moreover, a term “maintaining status quo” (現状維持 genjou iji) 
                                                          
18 The only one exception is research done among Korean women with the semi-structured group interview 
(Wiwattanapantuwong et al. 2013). 
19 Shibata and Tomokiyo, Fukushima Nuclear Accident, 34-55. 
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frequently appears in various questionnaires. However, it should be considered ambiguous due 
to the fact that the respondents may not always be aware what the current situation is 
(Arikawa et al 2014). Furthermore, the same entry appears unaltered in questionnaires 
conducted before and after Fukushima disaster, despite the “status quo” being entirely 
different at those points of time20.  
Secondly, the qualitative methods encourage open-ended responses impossible to evaluate  
by statistics, unlike quantitative studies, in the shape of multiple choice questionnaires, which  
do not let the participants speak freely about what they consider to be the most important 
issue21. In order to present the steps which the complicated mental processes consist of, it is 
necessary to analyze the answer chosen in the questionnaire more profoundly than the answer 
itself. By doing so, a deeper insight into one’s individual thoughts may be provided and minor 
opinions usually omitted by statistics can be examined in details.  
Lastly, an individual survey, a group discussion or personal interviews are said to be one of the 
most popular methods in social psychological research, as well as a relevant method for values 
elicitation and measuring attitudes (Renn & Swaton 1984). Based on all the above mentioned 
reasons, the results of this research are obtained by the qualitative methods, to the greatest 
extent by the interviews conducted by the author, however with the supporting role  
of interviews and testimonies already published. 
In order to address the importance of personal experience on attitude construction, this 
research intends to gather opinions from people who were affected by the Great East Japan 
Earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in various ways. A wide range of personal 
experience was examined within three target groups. The first one are people from the coastal 
part of Fukushima prefecture, evacuated due to the radiation. They used to live, or are still 
living, in the proximities of the nuclear power plant that was severely damaged during  
                                                          
20 Shibata and Tomokiyo, Fukushima Nuclear Accident, 43. 
21 Interview study among Korean women constitute a relevant example. One of the participants answered the 
question about radiation in the following way: I don’t know what to do. So I have no choice but to believe [our 
government].  
Although in a questionnaire her answer would be probably “I believe our government”,  interview study sheds  
a new light on her opinion: she has no choice but to believe.  
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the disaster.  The second group are inhabitants of western parts of the Fukushima prefecture 
(Aizu region). These people did not suffer directly due to the nuclear contamination and were 
not evacuated, since there is no nuclear power plant in the surroundings. Nevertheless,  
the entire region became the subject of rumors which affected the people working in various 
areas, e.g. agriculture, tourism, gastronomy, transport etc. Subsequently, the accident in the 
Fukushima Daiichi power plant had noticeable consequences on the local people. Lastly,  
the third group are inhabitants of Onagawa in the Miyagi prefecture. Due to the presence 
 of a nuclear power plant in the town, the inhabitants of Onagawa were potentially exposed  
to the same hazard of a nuclear accident and subsequent contamination as the representatives 
of the first group. However, Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, managed by Tohoku Electric, 
remained generally undamaged regardless of its location, closer to the epicenter of the 
earthquake than Fukushima Daiichi’s22. Moreover, it was reported that many local people 
sought shelter on the power plant’s grounds after the tsunami had struck23. Currently, 6 years 
after the disaster, Onagawa town is allegedly showing a distinguishable pace of reconstruction, 
presumably related to the presence of the nuclear power plant which influences the local 
economy. Therefore, the opinions of the locals toward nuclear power stations are likely to be 
positive.  
 
Interlocutor screening was simultaneously conducted via local NPOs referring, and through 
snowball sampling. The first group consisted of six subjects, the second one of four, and the 
third one of four. The questions asked were related to various cognitive and affective factors. 
Specifically, as it follows. 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Airi Ryu, “Nuclear Safety Culture in TEPCO and Tohoku Electric Power Company: The root-cause of the different 
fates of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant and Onagawa Nuclear Power Station”, 2014, 5, accessed 4 May 
2017 http://www-bcf.usc.edu/~meshkati/Onagawa%20NPS-%20Final%2003-10-13.pdf. 
23 Akiyoshi Obonai and Takao Watanabe, “地震・津波被災を乗り越えた女川原子力発電所”[Onagawa 
Nuclear Power Station Which Has Overcome the 3/11 Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster] (paper presented at the 
annual meeting of The Institute of Electrical Engineers of Japan, Tokyo, March 24-26, 2015), accessed 4 May 2017 
http://www.iee.jp/wp-content/uploads/honbu/03-conference/15-taikai/rinri/1_h5_4.pdf.  
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Cognitive: 
- Evaluation of nuclear power plants’ efficiency, reliability 
- Degree of trust in institutions, access to trustworthy data and news of high level  
of transparency 
- Risk perception; subjective feeling of being in danger, evaluation of probability  
of an accident 
- Obtained economic benefits or suffered personal loss due to the presence of nuclear 
power plants 
- Beliefs about nuclear energy which one finds credible 
- Evaluation of nuclear power plants producing clear, environmental-friendly energy 
- Visible relation between nuclear power and economic progress of the country 
- Personal evaluation of disaster’s range and occurred damage (long-lasting or large-scale) 
- Qualitative risk characteristics seen after the disaster (additional circumstances 
accompanying the risk situation, voluntariness, possibility of personal control)  
Emotional: 
- Fear of nuclear contamination 
- Anxiety about a similar accident in the future 
- Personal evaluation of one’s own and other people’s reaction after the accident. 
Whether it was over- or underreacting about the radiation issue and possible health 
damages 
- Personal evaluation of media’s coverage and its influence on one’s behavior. Specifically 
regarding its sensationalism  
- Subjective opinion about one’s understanding of radiation, nuclear physics  
and any related topic 
- Subjective, unconscious feelings or emotional states with unknown causes 
 
Nowadays in Japan, we can observe a heated debate about reopening or abolishment  
of nuclear power plants. This paper intends to support the validity of the universal 
14 
 
psychological mechanisms defined within dual-process theory, while devoting considerable 
attention to the complexity of the Japanese situation. Moreover, it seeks whether any 
compromise can be reached, while the dilemma of how to reconcile various opinions, rights 
and interests remains unsolved.  
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Chapter 2 
The Results for Group 1. Evacuees From the Twenty Kilometers Zone Around 
Fukushima Daiichi Power Plant 
The results presented in this chapter are based on interviews with five former inhabitants  
of Ōkuma town and one inhabitant of Minami Sōma city (Odaka district). Ōkuma town, where 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station is located, is still entirely under the strict evacuation 
order due to the high radiation contamination24,25. Minami Sōma city is divided into three 
districts, the most southern of which, Odaka, is located within the 20km surrounding the 
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station and was under the strict evacuation order from 22nd 
April 2011 until 12th July 201626,27. In addition, already recorder and published interviews were 
used as supplementary information28,29,30,31.  
Based on the above-mentioned sources, it has become clear that the further existence  
of nuclear power plants in Japan is a complicated, multi-faceted social problem which has to be 
investigated not only in relation to post-disaster events, but should also be traced back to the 
very origin, when a decision to build the nuclear plant in the coastal part of Fukushima 
prefecture was being made. Accordingly, citizens’ opinions about the nuclear power plants 
must be seen from the long-term perspective as the combination of various factors. 
 
 
                                                          
24 Ōkuma Town, accessed 20 April 2017, 
http://ohkuma.maildepot.jp/fukkou/sites/fukkou/files/161006kannneizu_1.pdf. 
25Ōkuma Reconstruction Vision, accessed 20 April 2017, http://ohkuma.maildepot.jp/fukkou/. 
26 Minami Sōma City: the Establishment of Evacuation Zones, accessed 20 April 2017, 
http://www.city.minamisoma.lg.jp/index.cfm/10,3099,66,html. 
27 Minami Sōma City: Lifting the Evacuation Order, accessed 20 April  2017, 
https://www.city.minamisoma.lg.jp/index.cfm/10,30246,66,html. 
28 朝まで生テレビ [Overnight live TV], [TV programme], 1 April 2017, accessed 5 April 2017 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6pdJRtWIO0g. 
29 Norma Field and Matthew Mizenko, trans., Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed? 
[Kindle edition]. Published by: Complainants for Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 2015. 
30 Hidetatsu Han’ya, interview by Hirokazu Watanabe, Center for Remembering 3/11, January 27, 2013, accessed 6 
May 2017, http://recorder311.smt.jp/movie/53361/. 
31 Naoko Kanai, interview, Voices from Tohoku, January 27, 2014, accessed 6 May 2017 
https://tohokukaranokoe.org/2014/01/27/%e9%87%91%e4%ba%95%e7%9b%b4%e5%ad%90%e3%81%95%e3%8
2%93/. 
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2.1 The “Safety Myth” 
According to the findings of The Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation 
Commission, there were evidences that, already at the stage of construction, TEPCO had made 
technical mistakes and inaccurate risk assessments which led to the structure of Fukushima 
Daiichi being incapable of withstanding such a powerful natural disaster. The report criticizes 
also the regulatory bodies for its negligence, in terms of not verifying whether or not TEPCO 
was following the guidelines32. Citizens became aware of such circumstances after the tragic 
accident and they admit that there had been doubtful incidents in the power plant before.   
For example, as Ms. Masumi Kowata from Ōkuma town said: “In 2004, by chairman 
Katsumata’s command, ex-chairman, I was monitoring [in the Fukushima Daiichi]. By that time, 
director Yoshida, director of the tsunami prevention division and other people, all were there. 
And the main topic then was to elevate the emergency generators, but I was told that the cost 
of it would be too much ”33. Another testimony describes the following situation: “About four 
or five years ago, a rumor swept through town. Tokyo Electric said they were going to cut 
scheduled inspections by half. The reason was cost-savings. It hasn’t been confirmed whether 
in fact they went ahead and cut inspections by half” (Ms. Tomiko Meguro, Futaba township)34. 
Ms. Naoko Kanai, from Naraha town said: “I remember few years ago some troubles in the 
plant were concealed which became quite an issue, but apparently people easily forget what 
had happened a few years before”35. Based on these statements, it is possible to affirm that for 
the local people it became clear that the company was trying to economize on safety standards, 
yet they did not act upon it.  
The reason for this behavior was that for the great majority of people such an enormous 
disaster and a subsequent explosion in the nuclear power plant were far beyond imagination.  
The testimonies like the one of Ms. Ono from Ōkuma town, are the most frequent: “I was born 
and raised in Ōkuma, I remember when power plant was being built. Such a thought, that it 
                                                          
32 The Official Report of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission, 27-28. 
33朝まで生テレビ [Overnight live TV]. 
34 Norma Field and Matthew Mizenko, trans., Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed? 
35 Ibid. 
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may be dangerous, I didn’t have at all”36. On the other hand, few people were holding a distinct 
degree of anxiety, typically due to some particular event. Ms. Akiko Anbe, a citizen of Minami 
Sōma, was asked if she had thought that such an accident may happen, to which she replied: 
“Nobody could believe it. When the Chūetsu earthquake happened in Niigata prefecture37,  
my son asked what if the same earthquake happened here and the nuclear power plant 
exploded? Everybody was saying there’s no way something like that happens”38, this clearly 
evoked her uneasiness about the matter. In the case of Mr. Kazami Masahiro from Kawauchi 
village, the reason for his strong objection against nuclear power plants were previous 
accidents, Chernobyl and Three Miles Island39.  
A phrase frequently appearing in the testimonies is a “safety myth” (安全神話 anzen shinwa).  
It describes the actions of the electric companies, politicians and scientists, aimed for 
maintaining a positive image of the nuclear power plants through public campaigns, 
advertisements, media coverage or appealing field trips, despite the existing negligence. At the 
time of the disaster, a great number of people were thinking that probably only the power 
plant can withstood tremors and tsunami.  
Another problem which occurred, due to the common belief in indestructibility of the reactors, 
and due to the disbelief that a natural disaster of such a huge scale may occur, was overlooking 
the importance of emergency drills, which resulted in a low disaster preparedness among 
citizens. They often complained about the evacuation drills being insufficient, not frequent and 
not explanatory. A woman from Ōkuma town, who requested to stay anonymous, said:  
“We had evacuation drills before, but only a part of us and maybe once a year. There were no 
general instructions for the town about what to do in the case of a disaster.”40 Another former 
                                                          
36 Ms. Ono. Interview by author. Tape recording. Sendai City, March 25, 2017. 
37 Niigata Prefecture Chūetsu Earthquake occured on 23 October 2004 and reached magnitude 6.8, Japan 
Meteorological Agency, accessed 8 May 2017 
http://www.data.jma.go.jp/svd/eqev/data/kyoshin/jishin/041023_niigata/nigata_main.htm. 
38 Akiko Anbe. Interview by author. Tape recording. Minami Sōma City, April 4, 2017. 
39 Norma Field and Matthew Mizenko, trans., Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed? 
40 Anonymous Former Inhabitant of Ōkuma Town. Interview by author. Tape recording. Sendai City, March 25, 
2017. 
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inhabitant of Ōkuma came to the bitter conclusion that: “If somebody could have predicted it,  
if there were drills organized regularly, many people could have been saved.”41. 
Moreover, “the safety myth” led to another kind of negligence which was poor preparedness  
and lack of key equipment on evacuation facilities. Recalling the events directly after the 
disaster, some people complained about lack of basic amenities at the shelter they evacuated 
to, like food supplies, blankets or mattresses. Asked what could lead to such a situation, 
interlocutors blamed the coordinators and their mindsets, which resulted in no set instructions 
for the evacuation facilities. However, not everybody had such traumatic memories. Ms. Ōkawa, 
who evacuated from Ōkuma town, explained that “the difference in the way people were 
treated [in the shelters] resides in the fact that there were no proper instructions for the 
shelters, no explanation about what should be done nor about what they should have”42.  
2.2 Urge for Reliable Information 
Concealing problems, disregarding the evacuation drills and poorly equipped shelters, are few 
examples of what was a generalized poor disaster preparedness and administrative 
carelessness. Despite some of them lack a direct connection to the management of the nuclear 
power stations, they explain why, after the tremendous disaster and the obvious damage  
in Fukushima Daiichi, citizens felt lied to, in terms of safety and reliability of the atomic energy. 
Another issue which contributed to the state of huge distrust towards energy companies, 
politicians and scientists, among the people from Fukushima, was the lack of information about 
the evacuation and the severity of the damages sustained by Fukushima Daiichi directly after 
the disaster. Mr. Han’ya, a former inhabitant of Namie town, reported: “On 12th March, I heard  
the announcement that due to the Prime Minister’s order we must evacuate immediately. They 
didn’t say a word about the power plant. Even the mayor of Namie town didn’t receive any 
note”43. Evacuees from Ōkuma town, were asked how did they obtain information about the 
accident in Fukushima Daiichi, they replied: “Everybody differently. There were no warnings  
at first” (Mr. Watanabe); “I heard about the explosion at work. Although they didn’t announce 
                                                          
41 Mr. Kowata. Interview by author. Tape recording. Sendai City, March 25, 2017. 
42 Ms. Ōkawa. Interview by author. Tape recording. Sendai City, March 25, 2017. 
43 Hidetatsu Han’ya, interview by Hirokazu Watanabe, Center for Remembering 3/11. 
19 
 
it officially” (Mr. Kowata, former engineer in Fukushima Daiichi); “From other citizens. TEPCO 
didn’t inform us, because they wanted to avoid panic” (Ms. Ōkawa); “I heard it in the news,  
in the TV at the gymnasium I evacuated to” (Anonymous woman)44. Such testimonies illustrate 
how difficult was it for ordinary people to obtain relevant information about the reason for 
evacuation. Mr. Watanabe provided additional remarks: „Ninety nine percent of people 
thought that they’d be able to come back very soon, like me. Then we understood that if you 
thought you can come back home, you were wrong”45. Accordingly, people were not only 
unaware of why they have to evacuate, they were not even told an approximate timespan the 
evacuation order was estimated to be enforced.  
 
Moreover, although the System of Prediction of Environment Emergency Dose Information 
(SPEEDI) managed by Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, was used 
to quantify the radiation, citizens and local authorities were not informed about  
the measurements. As a result, people from some regions were ordered to evacuate to areas 
with higher radiation46. In the course of time, fear of radioactive contamination posed  
a dilemma regarding further living in Fukushima prefecture, to a great number of people, even 
those showing a distinguishing emotional attachment to their homeland. Even at that stage,  
the countermeasures undertaken by TEPCO and the government were continuously found 
insufficient, especially dissatisfaction towards decontamination methods appears repeatedly  
in the testimonies. Mr. Han’ya from Namie town said: “Decontamination performed by the 
government was a complete nonsense. Around any house, they said they’d make it clean within 
a twenty meters radius. So what, twenty one meters further, you don’t do it? Where do you 
think we can come back to?”47. Former inhabitants of Ōkuma town confirmed that the 
decontamination was performed carelessly. One woman testified: “The work groups didn’t do it 
[decontamination] at all in the mountains, they didn’t even touch the ponds or places where 
                                                          
44 Interviews by author. 
45 Mr. Watanabe. Interview by author.  
46 Norma Field and Matthew Mizenko, trans., Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed? 
47 Hidetatsu Han’ya, interview by Hirokazu Watanabe, Center for Remembering 3/11. 
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water may flow down and gather”48. Ms. Ono added: “Even when it seems there’s no more 
radiation in the air, try to measure in the places such as window shutters. There’s plenty!”49. 
 
This section presented that both before the disaster, when the citizens were told that their 
concerns about the nuclear power station’s safety are unfounded and unjustified, and after  
the disaster, when multiple problems appeared, citizens of Fukushima were shown little 
interest from the institutions they trusted in. On the other hand, those who, appeased by  
“the safety myth”, remained indifferent to the energy policy issues taking place within  
the prefecture, are not few.  
 
2.3 Discrepancies Within the Society 
Another noticeable aftermath of the 3/11 disaster are the divisions that appeared within  
the society, which either did not existed before, or were not observable. The first example  
is a discrepancy between the city and the countryside. Fukushima Daiichi, although located  
in the Tohoku region, on the terrain of Okuma and Futaba towns50, was producing electricity 
mostly for the Kanto region51. Nowadays, six years after the disaster, a great number of people 
feel grief and anger, since they carried the risk of living in the proximities of a nuclear power 
source, while the ones who in fact were beneficiaries of the energy were citizens of the much 
densely populated Kantō region52. For that reason, inhabitants of the coastal part of Fukushima 
prefecture became aware that they were being treated as inferiors. Mr. Han’ya, evacuee from 
Namie town, explain the situation in the following way: “I think that energy for Tokyo should be 
produced in Tokyo Bay. I guess the government back then found out that in Futaba township 
people don’t complain and the ground is the cheapest. They fooled us from the very beginning 
                                                          
48 Anonymous Former Inhabitant of Ōkuma Town. Interview by author. 
49 Ms. Ono. Interview by author. 
50 Tokyo Electric Power Company: A List of the Nuclear Power Supply Facilities. 
51 Prefectures: Tochigi, Gunma, Ibaraki, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Yamanashi, Shizuoka and Tokyo city. “Tokyo 
Electric Power Company: Business Scale by Area”, accessed 10 May 2017 
http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/corpinfo/illustrated/business/business-scale-area-e.html. 
52 “Japanese Prefectures Ranking: Population, Area and Population Density”. January, 2017, accessed 12 May 2017 
http://uub.jp/rnk/p_j.html. 
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to build this plant”53.  Ms. Ono from Ōkuma town highlights how insignificant her hometown 
seems to be in the scale of the country: “Looking from the perspective of the entire Japanese 
population, twenty thousand people is less than one percent. We have been simply abandoned 
by the country”54.  
 
Simultaneously, due to an undisclosed and not well balanced system of reparations, 
discrepancies arose between the citizens in the cities, towns and villages within the twenty 
kilometers evacuation zone. According to the former inhabitants of Ōkuma town, they are 
receiving a substantial financial support from TEPCO, given to the fact that the town was a site 
of the nuclear power plant managed by the company55. On the other hand, the former 
inhabitant of Namie said: “The plant is not located in Namie, so the town didn’t get any 
reparations. To be fully honest, there were some reparations, but seems like only 10% [of the 
amount promised]. For the other towns: Ōkuma, Naraha, Tomioka and Futaba, TEPCO and the 
government made some arrangements, they provided buses to evacuate people. Nothing like 
that had place in Namie”56. Mr. Hideo Hasegawa, from the Independent Life Center in Iwaki city, 
explains the hostilities between the original citizens and the people who were evacuated  
to Iwaki from the area with severe radioactive contamination: “The relations between them are 
not good. Because of the reparations, the animosity between the people rose up abnormally. 
The evacuees are afraid and they are often hiding their identity in the temporary housing”57. 
 
Lastly in this section, the alleged inequalities between Japanese electric energy companies will 
be presented. Despite that the energy market in Japan is divided into regions, each of them  
is being monopolized by only one company58, their position towards each other is not 
necessarily cooperative, as one could expect. Some interlocutors supposed that TEPCO, being 
                                                          
53 Hidetatsu Han’ya, interview by Hirokazu Watanabe, Center for Remembering 3/11. 
54 Ms. Ono. Interview by author.  
55 Interview by author.  
56 Hidetatsu Han’ya, interview by Hirokazu Watanabe, Center for Remembering 3/11. 
57 Second Fuugai Forum. Sendai City, March 29, 2015. Accessed 15 May 2017. 
58 The Federation of Electric Power Companies of Japan: Ten Electric Power Companies as Responsible Suppliers of 
Electricity. Accessed June 18, 2017, 
http://www.fepc.or.jp/english/energy_electricity/company_structure/index.html. 
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the most influential company, especially among politicians, was able to avoid the consequences 
that the disaster could have done to its reputation. Mr. Han’ya from Namie makes reference  
to the other nuclear power plant in the region, managed by Tohoku Electric, which successfully 
withstood the earthquake and tsunami59: “I know few people from Tohoku Electric. If they said, 
even without calling names, that their plant was okay, because everything was done properly,  
it would be their end, they said. That’s how strong TEPCO is”60. 
 
2.4 Significance of the Perception of Benefit 
Among various emotional and cognitive properties examined, the perception of benefit  
is supposed to be the most significant for the opinion construction. The interviews with the 
former inhabitants of Ōkuma town, portrayed the enormous improvements and progress 
experienced by a region with an operating power plant. Ms. Ono, who was born and raised  
in Ōkuma, said: “ It became one of the wealthiest town in the entire country. Before there were 
no jobs and people were leaving. And then TEPCO came and built the power plant, so people 
could stay and work for TEPCO or its many subcontractors”61. Words of Mr. Kowata, another 
person who was born in Ōkuma, confirmed the circumstances: “It used to be  
an underpopulated area, where farming was the most common occupation. Many people had 
no other choice than work somewhere else. The town mayor at that time, aware of the 
situation, made the decision to allow the construction of the power plant ”62. 
 
The newly erected facilities created an abundance of jobs and soon the towns’ population 
increased rapidly due to the large inflow of nuclear industry employees. Ms. Ōkawa, one  
of those who moved to Ōkuma by that time, recalled: “Various companies, Toshiba or Hitachi, 
organized job transfers, because of the urgent demand for workers in the power plant. Then 
the town got subsidiaries and it profited a lot. Listening to the stories of my coworkers made 
me realize even more the change in everyday life. ‘Today you can buy a washing machine,  
                                                          
59 This topic will be thoroughly discussed in chapter number 4.  
60 Hidetatsu Han’ya, interview by Hirokazu Watanabe, Center for Remembering 3/11. 
61 Ms. Ono. Interview by author. 
62 Mr. Kowata. Interview by author. 
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in a month you can buy a fridge’ ”63. The above statements clearly depict the improvement  
of life standards experienced by the interlocutors. Stable, profitable jobs and generous 
subsidiaries from TEPCO and the government evoked a strong, long-lasting perception  
of benefit. Moreover, the image of TEPCO among the host-communities used to be 
exceptionally positive, and even now, despite the people’s awareness of the company’s 
negligence and poor disaster response, statements such as: “We’ve always had a good relations 
with TEPCO” or: “Even now, there is no hatred or regret toward TEPCO”, are not uncommon64.  
 
Since the inhabitants of Ōkuma still receive the financial support, the perception of benefit 
continues to influence their opinion about the nuclear power stations. As one of the women 
said: “Yes, I think that nuclear power plants are still needed. If TEPCO starts to lose money, they 
will cut our reparations”65. Among the interlocutors, nuclear energy is also often considered 
efficient, reliable and cheap. Mr. Watanabe, whose daughter entered a university  
in France after the family was evacuated from Ōkuma, raised an example of the situation of the 
nuclear power plants abroad: “It seems like in France nuclear power is still a main source  
of energy for now. Germany, on the contrary, is going to abolish nuclear power plants,  
but what? Seems like they are buying energy from France! That’s why I think it’s not so simple, 
just to shut them all down. In Japan maybe it would be better to shut them all down one day. 
But being realistic, we can’t do that”66. He also admitted that, even though his daughter is in 
France, the number of nuclear reactors in the country does not evoke any anxiety.  
 
On the other hand, the opinions of people who had little or no benefit due to the presence  
of the nuclear power plant are considerably different. Feeling of injustice, grief and regrets 
from the people who have to bear the consequences of the disaster and nuclear contamination, 
frequently appear in the testimonies. Mr. Masahiro Kazami, an evacuee from Kawauchi village, 
said: “In addition to growing my own food, I have been self-sufficient through such measures  
                                                          
63 Ms. Ōkawa. Interview by author.  
64 Interview by author.  
65 Anonymous Former Inhabitant of Ōkuma Town. Interview by author. 
66 Mr. Watanabe. Interview by author. This paper does not intend to verify the information stated by the 
interlocutor.  
24 
 
as using solar cells for my electrical supply. Why should I, who have never derived any benefit 
from the power companies, have to submit to being robbed of the foundations of my life?”67. 
Negative emotions are often strengthened by the fact that nobody has shouldered any 
responsibility for the radioactive leakage. Ms. Ryūko Tachibana from Namie explains her 
perspective in the following way: “Far from standing with us in our grief and anger, TEPCO  
and the government have shown no signs of attempting to face up to the situation sincerely. 
What is the true nature of responsibility to society on the part of large corporation?”68.  
 
Despite the main responsibility of the disaster relays on TEPCO and the government, some 
people have shown concerns and perceive a portion of it as their own. Given to the fact that 
the power plant is standing on the grounds of their towns, they feel to some extend 
accountable for dealing with the aftermaths of the accident. Ms. Naoko Kanai, from Naraha 
town, presented her stance about a storing facility for the radioactive waste: “According  
to the preliminary examination, it will be built in Naraha, Ōkuma or Futaba. Some people 
suggest to move it to another prefecture or abroad, but which prefecture, which country would 
accept that? The only possibility is to store the waste where the accident happened”69. 
 
2.5 Discussion 
On the basis of the above presented statements, it becomes clear that a group of evacuees 
from within the twenty kilometers radius from the Fukushima Daiichi is not uniformed and the 
opinions differ depending on, among other factors, the individual experience. It has been 
realized that among many people, the cognitive perception of loss, evaluation of disaster’s scale, 
and observations of the disaster response, together with  the urgent need for justice, evoked  
a negative emotional response. It can be supposed that unfavorable circumstances and 
personal feelings about Fukushima Daiichi accident, translocate the negative opinion toward 
the energy source at general. Like in the statement by Ms. Anbe from Minami Sōma: “I think 
that, if possible, there shouldn’t be any nuclear power plants in Japan. Many people still have 
                                                          
67 Norma Field and Matthew Mizenko, trans., Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed? 
68 Ibid. 
69 Naoko Kanai, interview, Voices from Tohoku. The temporary storing facility is nowadays located in Ōkuma town.  
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their houses, but they can’t go back to them and the whole family is separated. I know that 
many people from Namie committed suicide because they couldn’t bear it. I don’t want 
anybody else, now and in the future, to have such an experiences”70. 
 
In the case of the former inhabitants of Ōkuma town, although their attitudes toward nuclear 
power plants remain positive due to the cognitive perception of benefit, their unwillingness  
to resettle in proximities of the nuclear power plant again, would suggest the discrepancy 
between the positive attitude and factual behavior. All the interlocutors based their reluctance 
on: the fear of radioactivity, concern about the health issues or anxiety about the future 
generations71, which are all classified as affective components.  
 
Some people argue that the tragic accident should be treated as a lesson for the future;  
in terms of improving the crisis management and safety measures, also in other countries72,73. 
Others call for attention from Japanese nationals from further regions, in order to make them 
realize what mindset led to such fatal consequences74. 
 
The last outcome, which ought to be presented in this section is a growing need for alternative 
energy sources among citizens of eastern Fukushima. Even those who do not consider 
themselves as rejecters of nuclear power plants, are suggesting a transition towards more 
reliable energy sources in the future. The most frequently appearing in the statements were: 
wind energy, water energy, thermal energy, biomass and (still undeveloped) hydrogen energy. 
On the example of Minami Sōma city, where the number of solar panels and the role of solar 
energy grew significantly after the 3/11 disaster, it can be realized that citizens’ demand for 
new energy policy is gradually being put into practice. Nevertheless, the further exploitation  
of the nuclear power facilities is still a controversial  issue.  
 
                                                          
70 Akiko Anbe. Interview by author. 
71 Interviews by author. 
72 Mr. Watanabe. Interview by author. 
73 Norma Field and Matthew Mizenko, trans., Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed? 
74 Hidetatsu Han’ya, interview by Hirokazu Watanabe, Center for Remembering 3/11. 
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Chapter 3 
The Results for Group 2. Inhabitants of the Aizu Region, Western Part  
of Fukushima Prefecture 
The results presented in this chapter are based primarily on four interviews (two citizens  
of Kitakata city and two citizens of Aizu Wakamatsu city). In addition, already published 
interviews were used as supplementary information75,76,77,78,79,80.  
Both cities, located in the Aizu region in the western part of Fukushima prefecture, are well-
known tourist destinations for both its historical heritage, flourishing agriculture and organic 
farming. The distance to Fukushima Daiichi is approximately 100 kilometers.  By being far from 
the epicenter of the 3/11 earthquake, the damage sustained was relatively light, with  
no electricity or sewage cut off. Its position on the mainland protected it from the tsunami. 
Nevertheless, citizens experienced severe shakes and aftershocks.  
This chapter aims to show that despite the scale of the disaster in this region differs from  
the coastal part of the prefecture, its aftermaths had a great impact on people’s opinions 
towards nuclear power plants.  Moreover, Aizu region is commonly said to suffer mainly due  
to the rumors about the nuclear contamination, which negatively influenced sectors crucial for 
the local economy, like agriculture or tourism. However, contamination in the ground has been 
                                                          
75 Norma Field and Matthew Mizenko, trans., Fukushima Radiation: Will You Still Say No Crime Was Committed? 
[Kindle edition]. Published by: Complainants for Criminal Prosecution of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 2015. 
76 Kenkō Watanabe and Yōichi Koyama, interview (part 3), Voices from Tohoku, May 26, 2013, accessed 13 June 
2017 https://tohokukaranokoe.org/2013/07/28/20130526-
%e6%b8%a1%e9%83%a8%e5%81%a5%e5%85%89%e3%80%81%e5%b0%8f%e5%b1%b1%e8%a6%81%e4%b8%80
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in  fact discovered, making it hard to distinguish between an actual harm and a harmed 
reputation. 
3.1 The Response to the Nuclear Accident 
The content of this section reveals that there were numerous similarities in the public disaster 
response between Aizu region and the coastal part of the prefecture. Firstly, interlocutors 
admit that due to the presence of a “safety myth”, the area was not prepared for a catastrophe 
of this scale. Ms. Kyōko Sakai, a member of Aizu Center for Radiation Measurement, said: 
“Politicians didn’t consider the possibility that the accident may happen, so they couldn’t come 
up with any rational idea right after. I think they should think about the citizens, close the 
schools, instruct the people not to leave their homes. They couldn’t even do such basic 
things”81.  
Secondly, the information provided was insufficient. Citizens, after having experienced  
the severe earthquakes and having known about the nuclear accident from the media, were 
not informed about the severity of the situation. The farmers, who were about to start 
cultivation, were particularly affected by the lack of information. A woman from Aizu 
Wakamatsu, who requested to stay anonymous and has been a rice farmer for almost fifteen 
years, explained that: “We didn’t know if we could start planting or not. We were told that 
there were no official instructions, so we should wait. But there are limits  
to how long we can wait, not to influence the growth of crops”82.  
Next, lack of information and no disaster preparedness influenced the processes  
of decontamination and reparations. When it became obvious that the region could have been 
contaminated, local authorities in most of the districts decided not to decontaminate, in order 
not to deter potential tourists. As Mr. Hirukawa, president of an NGO supporting citizens’ 
movements in Kitakata city, explained: “If decontamination was conducted, tourist could have 
thought that the radioactivity was indeed very high. The local government intended to prevent 
                                                          
81 Kyōko Sakai. Interview by author. Tape recording. Aizu Wakamatsu city, May 11, 2017. 
82 Rice farmer. Interview by author. Tape recording. Aizu Wakamatsu city, May 11, 2017.  
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rumors which could have spread”83. Not all the citizens agreed with this decision. Particularly 
among the farmers, concerned about the radioactive elements in the crops, many people 
decided to conduct decontamination by themselves, despite limited instructions and no 
financial support assured. The rice farmer, who is examining her fields until now, says:  
“We don’t receive any money from TEPCO for those examinations. We sent a claim, but it was 
rejected on the basis of the country’s statement that Aizu region is clear. After three years we 
received the reimbursement for the examination conducted in the first year”84. The statement 
by Mr. Hirukawa adds additional information: “It took one or two years  
to establish the system of reparations, while everybody was troubled right after the accident. 
There was a very urgent need for any information or advice”85.  
Lastly, people from Aizu region who feel, to the varying extent, harmed by the nuclear accident 
and its aftermaths, consider unfair the fact that nobody bears responsibility for the catastrophe. 
In addition, some people connect the lax accountability with no protection for the citizens.  
Ms. Sakai testified: “No law was established, regarding nuclear contamination and 
responsibility for that. There were few regulations about nuclear power plant’s workers,  
but nothing including the citizens”86. 
3.2 Aizu Identity 
Fukushima prefecture, roughly 120km wide, is divided into three regions: coastal, central and 
Aizu. After the nuclear accident in 2011, a particular solidarity among people in the prefecture 
became visible, however the inhabitants of the Aizu region are characterized by their unique 
way of thinking.  
Firstly, their attitude towards the 3/11 accident is complex. Since it happened in the same 
prefecture, many consider the accident as very severe, yet too distant to have direct influence 
on their lives. The testimony like the one of Ms. Watanabe from Kitakata, is the most common: 
“A nuclear accident is for me like a story from a distant place. I was wondering does it really 
                                                          
83 Yasuhiro Hirukawa. Interview by author. Tape recording. Kitakata city, April 24, 2017. 
84 Rice farmer. Interview by author. 
85 Yasuhiro Hirukawa. Interview by author. 
86 Kyōko Sakai. Interview by author.  
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have any influence on us?”87. Mr. Hirukawa explained the emotional connection in relation  
to the defamatory media coverage: “For us, such news evoke anger, but this anger  
is not constant. The animosity peaks only during TV broadcasting. I suppose that among  
the people from the coastal part of the prefecture, where such problems are more familiar, 
anger accumulates and emotions are stronger, but here, because we are geographically away, 
we are also emotionally distant” 88 . However, all the interlocutors admitted that their 
attachment to the common name “Fukushima” is very strong. Ms. Sakai recalled when a severe 
earthquake happened in the neighboring Niigata prefecture: “The nuclear power plant located 
there was having some troubles and maybe the same accident could have happened, but my 
sense of danger was completely different. This time I found the accident somewhat familiar”89. 
Secondly, the population of Aizu has been greatly divided between those who believe in the 
region’s invulnerability, and those who are concerned about nuclear contamination. 
Interlocutors mentioned disagreements between farmers, unsure if the examination of the 
fields is in fact needed, and mothers uneasy about the health of their children. Nowadays, it is 
said that the majority of the population believes that Aizu region is safe, however some people 
have doubts: “I guess that many people cannot leave this area, so they just keep telling  
to themselves that it’s okay”90. 
Lastly, unlike people from the coastal Fukushima who feel inferior to the metropolis because  
of the circumstances surrounding the disaster, people from Aizu developed a feeling  
of superiority. They realized that Japanese society is seeking comfort excessively which leads  
to electricity and resources being wasted. Therefore, the population of Aizu is proud of leading  
a simple life in contact with nature, also considered important from the point of view of energy 
saving. Mr. Toshio Muto, after presenting the appeal of countryside life, concluded: 
“Comparing the potential risk of radiation and moving to the big city, I think that still I don’t 
want to leave Aizu”91. Ms. Watanabe finds living on the province as a meaningful part of their 
                                                          
87 Mika Watanabe. Interview by author. Tape recording. Kitakata city, April 24, 2017.  
88 Yasuhiro Hirukawa. Interview by author. 
89 Kyōko Sakai. Interview by author. 
90 Rice farmer. Interview by author. 
91 Toshio Muto and Ai Muto. Interview (part 3), Voices from Tohoku. 
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education: “For my generation, parents bringing up children,  
a simple lifestyle is difficult. Nowadays, if kids don’t have the newest games , they can’t blend in. 
So I’m thinking that this mentality change is needed equally among children and adults”92. 
Moreover, many mothers find it safer for children to be fed with products from their own 
gardens which are more trustworthy than food from supermarkets. 
3.3 From Indifference to Civil Society 
Citizens of Aizu region, due to their geographic distance from Fukushima Daiichi, were not 
exposed to the benefits and risks carried by living in the proximity of a nuclear power plant.  
For that reason, the overwhelming majority of them, is believed to be indifferent towards  
the issues related to the energy production in Japan, until the disaster happened. Neutral 
attitude was intrinsically related with lack of basic knowledge, e.g. there were people unaware 
of the fact that the nuclear power plant was located in the Fukushima prefecture, or that  
it produced electricity for the Kanto region. Mr. Hirukawa said: “It changed completely after  
the disaster and we were feeling angry, we felt sadness due to the rumors that harmed our 
region, and the interest toward nuclear energy raised significantly”93.The rice farmer from Aizu 
Wakamatsu explained how the relation between citizens and officials has changed since the 
3/11: “We weren’t demanding enough towards the local administration and after the disaster it 
failed to provide an efficient leadership. Consequently, our demands changed, but so did the 
officials’ awareness. Nowadays many young people who want to revitalize Fukushima 
prefecture are becoming public servants”94.  
However, the ordinary citizens have also become more active, since people realized the actual 
power of local, small-scale projects. Mr. Hirukawa raised numerous examples of grass-root 
movements or NGOs established in the local community within the last six years and added: 
“Also organic farmers are becoming involved into various activities, mainly educational. I must 
say that this is a visible change among people in Aizu which wouldn’t have happened without 
                                                          
92 Mika Watanabe. Interview by author.  
93 Yasuhiro Hirukawa. Interview by author. 
94 Rice farmer. Interview by author. 
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the nuclear accident”95. One of the factors which greatly influenced the citizens’ activation was 
disappointment towards politicians, especially regarding the administration’s methods  
of dealing with the aftermaths of the 3/11 disaster. Interlocutors were criticizing the decision  
of local authorities not to conduct decontamination, as well as an inefficient technique  
of decontaminating other regions of Fukushima prefecture. Moreover, while the Fukushima 
Daiichi related health issues are yet to be officially acknowledged, some people suppose that 
prefectural statistics, e.g. regarding the thyroid cancer among children, are intentionally 
miscalculated. Ms. Sakai, and other people who found official statements unreliable, perceived 
hostile attitudes in the authorities they were trying to discuss their postulates with. She 
recalled: “When we went to the prefectural office, they didn’t let us in the room to talk, and the 
official who went out didn’t even bring his name card. Every time we try to present our 
standpoint to any institution, they act impolitely”96. Some people distinguish between local 
government and high rank politicians, pointing out that the former are more trustworthy, and 
more familiar with the region’s circumstances. In Aizu, where human bonds within the 
neighborhoods are strong, many people felt encouraged to work together in order to deal with 
the unfavorable consequences themselves.  
Trust may be crucial for dealing with the harmful rumors in the region. Farmers frequently 
complain about difficulties to meet the customers’ demands. For example, while some claim  
to have the products thoroughly examined, others are anxious about the fact that crops are 
being tested. Farmers in Aizu are aware of the discrepancies between the way of thinking 
among customers from Fukushima and from outside of the prefecture. The latter tends  
to associate “Fukushima” with something dangerous, even though the contaminated crops are 
extremely rare and they do not enter the market. Most of the farmers continue to examine 
their crops to avoid any connection between them and radiation related health problems. 
Furthermore, they believe that developing a trust-based relationship between farmers and 
customers may be the first step to overcome the rumors, as is happening at the local level, and 
finally bring back the customers from the entire country.  
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96 Kyōko Sakai. Interview by author. 
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3.4 Renewable Energy Boom 
According to the interlocutors, one of the most visible consequences of the 3/11 disaster is  
a rapid development of renewable energy sources in the entire Fukushima prefecture. 
According to Mr. Hirukawa, who is actively contributing to this process, in Aizu region the 
progress is the fastest and the most diverse, regarding solar energy, wind energy, geothermal 
energy, hydropower and biomass97. While many citizens consider renewable energy sources  
as the most reliable, the cleanest and the safest, those who are aware of their limitations are 
also not few. Mr. Hirukawa admitted: “Many people are supporting the switch towards 
renewable energy sources, but it is still too early to speak about the spirit of entire Aizu’s 
population”98.  The most common words of criticism in the testimonies relate to the natural 
energy’s ability to replace the output of big-scale nuclear power facilities. However, Ms. Sakai 
believes that the development of renewable energy is deliberately hindered by the government, 
which prefers to invest on nuclear power projects99. Moreover, she and Mr. Hirukawa share the 
belief that energy should be produced possibly on a local level. This would strengthen bonds 
between neighbors, raise people’s awareness towards energy production and make them 
respect the energy and the environment.  
3.5 Discussion 
As interviews showed, in Aizu region even people from different backgrounds tend to be 
against nuclear power plants. However, the strength with which they backup their position,  
as well as their arguments, differs.  
The basis of the cognitive components can be stated as it follows. Japan’s geographical 
condition is not favorable for constructing nuclear power plants, due to the frequent 
earthquakes and limited area to store radioactive waste. Some people are also concerned 
about the facilities’ outdated technology, which carries an additional risk. One of the 
interlocutors worries about the exploitation of mixed plutonium fuels, which could be used  
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for military purposes. On the other hand, the activist of renewable energies from Kitakata city, 
considers all large-scale facilities, regardless thermal or nuclear, to be producing energy 
excessively, taking into account the decreasing population and electricity demand. Hence, 
energy production should change to, possibly, a local-level.  
From the emotional perspective, many people fear that a similar accident may happen in the 
future, yet the reasons for this anxiety lies within a cognitive perception. For example, 
awareness of constructional mistakes in Fukushima Daiichi, combined with distrust towards 
authorities, leads to disbelief regarding the stability and safety of other nuclear facilities. Many 
people believe that the “safety myth” and the mindset blamed for causing the accident  
in Fukushima Daiichi, are still present. Nuclear power stations’ image, as uncontrollable and 
hazardous, is thriving. Due to the risk of large-scale radioactive contamination, some people 
find them harmful for the environment. For example, the rice farmer, aware of Japan’s low 
food self-sufficiency rate, considers nuclear power stations a threat which may destroy the 
limited farmlands and crops in the country.  
The huge dilemma within Aizu citizens is related to energy deficit. Some people are afraid that  
if all the nuclear power plants are decommissioned, there will not be enough electricity. 
Moreover, some interlocutors realized that producing energy always poses a liability, regardless 
of the source, however, comparing benefits with potential risk, nuclear power plants are not 
worth further exploitation.  
All the interlocutors consider themselves a minority, who is fairly holding on to their beliefs, 
and actively working for them, despite the criticism they are exposed to, and against the 
indifferent attitude of people in the neighborhood, media or politicians. Interlocutors admit 
that it is easier to listen and believe the official announcements, as the majority of people  
in Aizu do. They consider others in the region as easy to manipulate and forgetful. In addition, 
they find it important for the local community to stay active, defend their stance and preserve 
their values, in order to support the shift toward a civil society. Their activities, subsequently, 
show that there is no discrepancy between their attitudes and opinions.  
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Lastly, a tendency supporting dual-process theory was discovered. Individuals with more 
knowledge are prone to show either strongly fixed opinions, or difficulties to establish one. 
Moreover, people who consider themselves knowledgeable, have a more individualistic way  
of thinking. Trust towards scientists has raised significantly, since many consider the knowledge 
based on science the most reliable and unchangeable, free of any political thoughts. On the 
other hand, people with relatively little knowledge tend to stay indifferent and follow the easily 
accessible information.  
It can be concluded that the perception of risk and benefits from the nuclear power plant was 
noticeably weaker among population of Aizu than other parts of Fukushima prefecture. 
However, after the 3/11 disaster people’s rejection towards nuclear power plants and support 
for renewable energies’ projects show a growing tendency. Moreover, despite this process is  
in its initial phase, the switch to an active civil society is ongoing. However, Aizu’s population  
is said to be prone to preserve the “safety myth”, therefore improvements on the 
communication’s channels between politicians and civilians, as well as rising the awareness  
of the potential of the latter, are recommended. 
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Chapter 4 
The Results for Group 3. Inhabitants of Onagawa Town, Miyagi Prefecture 
Onagawa is a small town located on the Pacific coast of the Miyagi prefecture. It neighbors with 
a bigger city called Ishinomaki, and its main industry is fishing. It sustained severe damages due 
to the earthquake and tsunami in 2011, and its population has continuously decreased from 
above ten thousands to around six thousands100. However, Onagawa Nuclear Power Station, 
managed by Tohoku Electric, withstood the disaster, and nowadays Onagawa is showing  
a remarkable pace of reconstruction within the region. 
The results presented in this chapter are based on interviews with four people. Three of them 
are inhabitants of the Takenoura district, located within the 5km radius from the nuclear power 
plant, the remaining person is a board member at Onagawa’s fish market.  
4.1 From Disputes to Acceptance 
This section intends to trace back the circumstances of Onagawa Nuclear Power Station to the 
time it was being built, due to its significance for a better understanding of the current citizens’ 
opinions. As interlocutors said, when Tohoku Electric revealed its intentions to build a nuclear 
power facility in Onagawa, the local society became greatly divided. As Ms. Suzuki recalled: 
“Right after the construction of the power plant was decided, the atmosphere was really awful. 
Even in our tiny Takenoura people were pointing fingers on each other, and were gathering 
only with those with the same opinion”101. She added that nobody remained indifferent and the 
whole town was engaged into disputes.  
Moreover, presumably the fishermen were particularly against, due to their concern about 
possible contamination of the water. Tohoku Electric was trying various methods to convince its 
opponents, who are said to eventually have changed their opinions, after receiving substantial 
                                                          
100 Onagawa Town’s Statistic Data: Population, accessed 24 June 2017, 
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101 Tomiko Suzuki. Interview by author. Tape recording. Onagawa town, May 05, 2017. 
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compensations in exchange of their fishing territories. Nowadays, after forty years since the 
power plant was built, citizens admit that the power plant happened to be an enormous source 
of profit for the town. 
There is a common belief that after the 3/11 disaster, Onagawa is recovering rapidly due to the 
presence of the nuclear power plant, however, interlocutors shed a new light on this matter.  
As Mr. and Ms. Suzuki said, according to the reform in 2005 multiple smaller towns and villages 
were combined into bigger administrative units. Ishinomaki city absorbed five nearby towns, 
and Onagawa was also scheduled to be annexed. Nonetheless, citizens voted against it, since 
Onagawa was in a very stable economic situation, and joining a bigger municipality would not 
be beneficial. After the disaster it became clear that this decision greatly influenced the 
reconstruction process. As Mr. Suzuki explained: “Onagawa’s reconstruction is progressing fast, 
because it remained an independent town. We have our own town mayor, own town council, 
and we are of a compact size. The towns which decided to become a part of Ishinomaki are all 
governed by one mayor, and their previously independent town halls resemble branch offices. 
Merging really slows down the reconstruction processes”102. Therefore, it is not the presence  
of the nuclear power plant alone which drives the reconstruction, it was the decision made  
in 2005, which was influenced by the Tohoku Electric’s facility.  
4.2 Close-Knit Local Society 
In this section characteristics of Onagawa’s local community will be presented. As the previous 
section showed, the citizens of Onagawa have been acting jointly, in solidarity to take crucial 
decisions for their town. However, it should not go unnoticed that this community consists  
of both original citizens, and the resettled employees of Tohoku Electric. As Ms. Suzuki testified, 
one of the greatest benefits for the city, next to economic ones, was an inflow of new people  
to the town: “I like that employees of the power plant moved to Onagawa with their families, 
not alone like it is common in Japan. This rapid growth of population was a great stimulus for us, 
original citizens. With the subsidiaries many new facilities were built and our town changed  
                                                          
102 Shigeo Suzuki. Interview by author. Tape recording. Onagawa town, May 05, 2017. 
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for better”103. Also Ms. Mochida, mother of two preschool girls, said: “From my generation, 
people currently bringing up children, half are employees of Tohoku Electric. Of course they 
have some private events, but they are integrating with the others on a daily basis, and their 
kids play with the others in the kindergarten”104. 
Moreover, interlocutors form Takenoura testified that Tohoku Electric finds transparency and 
communication with local people very important. Mr. Suzuki recalled: “Since I remember, 
people from Tohoku Electric, if any irregularities happened in the power plant, visited houses 
and handed in papers with: what was the problem, its reasons, how did they fix it, etc. They 
don’t go only to the heads of districts, but they walk around from one house to another”105.  
He also added that employees of Tohoku Electric frequently take part in various town’s festivals. 
In Onagawa, ordinary citizens and employees of Tohoku Electric socialize on a daily basis and 
have close-knit, friendly bonds. Moreover, the company addresses to the citizens with frequent 
reports, about irregularities and responding to the local community’s demands. For that reason, 
the degree of trust towards the company, and subsequently to the energy industry, is relatively 
high. People do not seek information about technical issues or potential contamination, as the 
representatives of the two previous groups, because they believe that the management of the 
nuclear power plant in Onagawa functions well. Apart from the positive attitude towards safety 
systems in the power plant, interlocutors also had a favorable image of the government’s 
reconstruction policies.  
4.3 Negative Image of Nuclear Power 
Although the previous section presented positive aspects of living in the proximities of nuclear 
power plant, this one shows anxieties and concerns of the local community. Like  
the representatives of the two previous groups, the inhabitants of Onagawa are afraid of the 
nuclear power dreadful disastrous potential: big-scale disaster with long-lasting consequences. 
For that reason, nuclear power plants have an image of not being environmentally friendly.  
Mr. Katō, representing fishermen, shared a lot about environmental issues. As he could tell 
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from the visibly and rapidly raising sea level, “global warming is a huge problem nowadays, and 
countries worldwide should cooperate to reduce its impact. Nuclear power plants,  
as contributors to the global warming, should be abolished”106. Lastly, Mr. Katō shared his 
negative experience related to the disaster’s aftermaths: “Onagawa has been suffering due  
to the rumors since then. There was an elevated radiation level right after the catastrophe,  
but it descended very quickly. We measure every catch, and they fit even stricter norms than 
before. Still, the government doesn’t let fish and seafood form Onagawa to be exported”107.  
Renewable energy is mentioned frequently as an alternative to nuclear power; however all the 
interlocutors are aware of its limitations, mostly poor efficiency and a considerable need  
for development. Therefore, those who argue in favor of the abolishment of nuclear power 
plants, highlight that this is a process that should progress very slowly. The reasons are still 
limited alternatives and possible negative economic consequences for the town. Moreover,  
Mr. Katō realized that people’s mentality need to be changed. Despite the country’s energy-
saving policy and modern architectural solutions which help to economize electricity, people 
still tend to waste it.  
4.4 Discussion  
Inhabitants of Onagawa admitted that throughout the years they “learned how to live with the 
nuclear power plant”. Nowadays, discussions about its existence are uncommon, and 
opponents are a minority. Although to some extent it existed before, after the 3/11 disaster, 
citizens’ awareness about possible accidents raised significantly. Yet, due to the remarkable 
degree of trust towards Tohoku Electric and the local government, interlocutors firmly believe 
that no accident may happen in Onagawa.  
 
This chapter presented that among citizens of Onagawa, attitudes towards nuclear power 
plants are based on both cognitive and emotional factors. The former are mainly perception  
of benefits, awareness about environmental issues and trust in the managing company, while 
the latter are anxiety about possible large-scale accidents in the future, fear of radiation and its 
                                                          
106 Hiroshi Katō. Interview by author. Tape recording. Onagawa town, May 26, 2017.  
107 Hiroshi Katō. Interview by author.  
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long-lasting, health-affecting consequences. Nonetheless, trust towards Tohoku Electric, and 
close-knit friendly relations with its employees and their families seem to be crucial to outweigh 
the anxiety, and let people continue living in proximities of the nuclear power plant, despite 
their objections. One person highlighted his concern about environmental issues  
as a compelling factor against nuclear power plants, yet the awareness of local economics, 
which may be harmed, influenced this person’s opinion into opposing the shutdown of the 
power plant in the near future. Subsequently, there are noticeable discrepancies between 
attitudes and opinions among the citizens of Onagawa. Moreover, although both cognitive  
and emotional factors are influential, the former seems to be dominant.  
Furthermore, this chapter confirmed the results of previous studies. People living closer to the 
nuclear power facilities tend to have more positive opinions towards them. The fact that trust 
towards the nuclear power plant’s management reduces the citizens’ need for additional 
information from other sources, confirms the premises of dual-process theory. However, 
although a high degree of trust makes it easier for the citizens to continue living in Onagawa,  
it can potentially have baneful consequences in the case of any natural disaster in the future,  
as it happened in Fukushima, where people’s disaster preparedness was very low. One of the 
interlocutors has already realized that evacuation drills being organized in Onagawa are 
insufficient. Therefore, the citizens should remember the tragic events from Fukushima 
prefecture, and Tohoku Electric must be aware of the responsibility they bear for the citizens’ 
lives.  
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Conclusion 
This paper aimed to present the opinions about nuclear power plants within the selected part 
of the Japanese population, affected by the 3/11 disaster, as well as the social phenomena 
which shaped those opinions. The catastrophe which hit the north-eastern coast of Japan  
in 2011, was of an unprecedented scale. its aftermaths are still being dealt with in the entire 
country and the debate about the further existence of the nuclear power plants remains 
unsolved. Moreover, the situation of Fukushima prefecture is particularly complicated, due to 
the still elevated nuclear contamination.  
It became clear that for the victims of the dreadful accident, tight bonds with local community 
are very important, and they contribute greatly to an effective recovery. Communities from the 
coastal part of the Fukushima prefecture, which were evacuated and resettled chaotically, 
seem to lose their capacity to contribute to a smooth region’s recovery, without being 
established in a new community or reunited with their former. In Japan, managed mainly by the 
centralized government, people are slowly discovering how much they can achieve by acting 
locally. In Aizu region the civil society is forming, yet it cannot be said if this trend will spread 
around the country. Moreover, as far as the cooperation between nuclear power plants’ 
management and local societies is concerned, the comparison between Ōkuma and Onagawa 
proved that it should not be based solely on the financial benefits, but mainly on the 
transparency and efficient communication.  
Furthermore, the citizens of Tohoku region, even those who have favorable attitudes towards 
nuclear power, showed an urgent need for alternative energy sources, which would not have 
nuclear energy’s catastrophic potential. Currently, although the development of renewable 
energy sources in Fukushima and Miyagi prefectures is enormous, the majority of the 
interlocutors admitted that they are not capable yet of replacing the nuclear power.  
Lastly, this research confirmed the premises of the dual-process theory. People’s opinions were 
shaped by both cognitive and emotional factors, however, presumably due to the confusion 
which arose after the nuclear accident, the cognitive ones were found to some degree stronger. 
Most of the interlocutors are still struggling to establish a firm opinion, yet few people remain 
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rather indifferent and act in accordance with easily accessible information. Trust, which allows 
people to minimize the effort of searching and verifying information, proved to be of a great 
significance, especially towards the scientists. Their knowledge, confirmed and free of politics, 
may be crucial in the debate about new energy sources, as well as for establishing  
a constructive dialogue between the citizens, the government and energy-producing facilities.  
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